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The chapter challenges the assumption that data privacy frameworks in general and the GDPR 
in particular can provide an appropriate regulatory solution for big data. It argues that in order 
to be able to properly reflect on regulatory approaches that grasp with big data challenges, 
closer attention should be paid to these particular challenges. In this respect, this chapter makes 
three distinct contributions to the debate regarding regulatory approaches to big data: First, it 
develops a taxonomy of big data challenges that allows a comprehensive overview of the issues 
at stake. Second, it examines the capabilities and limitations of the GDPR to address the risks 
identified in the proposed taxonomy. Third, it offers some suggestions on the pathways that 




Big data analysed through algorithms are considered the oil of the modern online economy. 
The value of big data is immense, but they also pose significant challenges to individuals and 
the society as a whole. It is a common assumption that big data, data mining, algorithmic 
decision-making and Artificial Intelligence (AI) should be considered as data privacy issues1 
 
1 For instance, Yeung notes: ‘The right most clearly implicated by Big Data driven hypernudging is the right to 
informational privacy, given the continuous monitoring of individuals and the collection and algorithmic 
processing of personal digital data’. Karen Yeung, ‘“Hypernudge”: Big Data as a mode of regulation by design’, 
(2017) 20 (1) Information, Communication & Society, 118, 124. 
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that should be addressed by data privacy laws. In this respect, the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (hereinafter the GDPR)2 is considered as the central legislative measure aimed at 
addressing big data risks3 and has been hailed as ‘the first piece of legislation for AI’ that 
processes personal data.4  
This chapter challenges the assumption that data privacy frameworks in general and the 
GDPR in particular can provide an appropriate regulatory solution for big data.5 It argues that 
in order to be able to properly reflect on regulatory approaches that grasp with big data 
challenges, closer attention should be paid to these particular challenges. Searching for 
appropriate regulatory solutions requires a focus on the problems that need to be addressed. 
While big data challenges have been extensively discussed in the literature; remarkably, there 
is a lack of systemisation of big data risks that would permit a reflection about potential 
regulatory responses to these which goes beyond the commonly proposed data privacy 
frameworks.  
In this respect, this chapter makes three distinct contributions to the debate regarding 
regulatory approaches to big data: First, it develops a taxonomy of big data challenges that 
allows a comprehensive overview of the issues at stake. Second, it examines the capabilities 
and limitations of the GDPR to address the risks identified in the proposed taxonomy. Third, it 
 
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), Official Journal of the European Union , L 
119/1, 4 May 2016. 
3 EDPS, Opinion 7/2015 Meeting the challenges of big data- A call for transparency, user control, data 
protection by design and accountability. 
4 Paul Nemitz, ‘Constitutional democracy and technology in the age of artificial intelligence’, Philosophical 
Transactions. R. Soc. (2018): 1. The European Commission notes that ‘the rules laid down in the [General Data 
Protection] Regulation provide a general framework and contain specific obligations and rights that are 
particularly relevant for the processing of personal data in AI’. See Commission, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Data protection rules as a trust-enabler in the EU and 
beyond – taking stock, Brussels, 24.7.2019, COM(2019) 374 final.  
5 For instance, the EDPS states: ‘The question is not whether to apply data protection law to big data, but rather 
how to apply it innovatively in new environments.’ EDPS, Opinion 7/2015, n 3, 4.   
 3 
offers some suggestions on the pathways that regulators should be considering when 
approaching big data and AI.  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 proposes a typology of big data and AI 
challenges. This categorises big data challenges at two levels: individual and societal. 
Individual level challenges are classified in two further dimensions: those that relate to the 
processing of the data and those that are linked to the outcomes of such processing. The 
taxonomy of big data challenges is necessary if we are to seriously consider regulatory 
methodologies and analytical prisms to approach these. Rather than relying on the simplistic 
assumption -which even the GDPR adopts to some extent- that data protection law should catch 
in its protective net all the issues that big data and AI raise because it applies to the processing 
of personal data, the proposed taxonomy reveals that big data present challenges -both at the 
individual and at the societal level- are far from the scope or irrelevant to data protection 
frameworks due to their complex dynamics, actors, processes and outcomes.  
In the light of the taxonomy developed, Section 3 examines the role that the GDPR can 
play to address big data and AI challenges. It finds that this legal instrument can regulate 
individual big data risks that relate to the processing of personal data, despite the scepticisms 
raised in this respect. The GDPR can also potentially play an indirect role in addressing 
individual level challenges that occur as outcomes of the processing and societal level threats, 
but this is very limited and clearly not enough taking into account the issues arising in the big 
data age. Section 4 considers the regulatory pathways and methodologies to address big data 




2. Mapping the Challenges of Big Data: A Taxonomy 
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2.1 Preliminary issues and caveats 
Before we proceed with the analysis, a number of caveats and clarifications is required. A first 
question that arises when attempting to map the challenges of big data is a definitional one. 
What is meant by big data ‘challenges’? Is it the same as speaking of big data ‘risks’ or 
‘threats’? Admittedly, the concepts of ‘challenges’, ‘concerns’, ‘risks’ and ‘threats’ appear 
semantically similar; nevertheless, this chapter opts to adopt the ‘challenges’ or ‘concerns’ 
terminology to broadly denote the different legal -and to an extent ethical- ‘issues’ that big data 
and AI raise.  
This is a deliberate choice: I approach big data issues in a neutral way, that steers away 
from the GDPR’s ‘risks’ terminology. More particularly, it is well-known that the GDPR marks 
the introduction of a risk-based approach to data protection.6 This is pursued mainly by data 
protection impact assessments (DPIAs)7 that controllers must undertake ‘where a type of 
processing in particular using new technologies, …is likely to result in a high risk to the rights 
and freedoms of natural persons’,8 and ex post notifications of data breaches to the supervisory 
authorities and the data subject9 when they are ‘likely to result in a high risk to the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons’.10 Recital 75 explains in this respect that risks ‘of varying 
likelihood and severity may result from personal data processing’ and could lead to ‘physical, 
material or non-material damage’ and provides an indicative list of these. The ‘risk’ of 
processing, therefore, acquires a specific normative significance under the GDPR that triggers 
several obligations for controllers. It should be clarified from the outset that the taxonomy 
 
6 See Maria Eduarda Gonçalves, ‘The EU data protection reform and the challenges of big data: remaining 
uncertainties and ways forward’ (2017) 26 (2) Information & Communications Technology Law, 90, 99.  
7 Articles 35, 36 GDPR and Recital 76. For an ethical and social impact assessment see Alessandro Mantelero, 
‘AI and Big Data: A blueprint for a human rights, social and ethical impact assessment’ (2018) 34 Computer 
Law & Security Review, 754.  
8 Article 35 (1) GDPR. 
9 Articles 33 and 34 GDPR.  
10 Article 34 (1) GDPR. 
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developed in this chapter understands big data ‘issues’ and ‘challenges’ in a way that does not 
attribute to these any normative value and is not linked to the meaning of ‘risks’ and ‘risk 
assessments’ under the GDPR.    
Secondly, big data challenges have been extensively discussed in the academic 
literature and beyond.11 The present analysis builds on this literature but aims to move the 
discussion a step further by providing a classification of these. The classification is proposed 
as a methodological attempt to systematise these challenges at two levels (individual and 
societal) and two further dimensions at the individual level (challenges associated to the 
processing of personal data and challenges associated to the outcomes of such processing). The 
specific challenges falling under each category are depicted in Table 1 and analysed in detail 
below. The taxonomy provides a useful tool to structure the discussion on big data issues and 
more importantly to organise the debate on the appropriateness of regulatory approaches to big 
data both current (the GDPR) and future. In this respect, this chapter fills an important gap in 
the literature on regulatory responses to big data.  
Thirdly, the chapter uses various examples from big health data, but avoids limiting the 
discussion only to health data for two main reasons. The first reason concerns the problems 
around defining health data. As seen in Chapter 112 and other chapters in this book, it is very 
difficult to distinguish sensitive health data from apparently innocuous information (like a 
super-market list) that might reveal important details about a person’s diet and therefore health. 
Furthermore, big data have numerous lifecycles and different datasets are aggregated at 
different time points, so it is difficult to specify when exactly ‘health data’ are analysed. 
Second, the proposed taxonomy applies to big health data analytics -seen here as an application 
 
11 EDPS, Opinion 7/2015, n 3.  
12 See Maria Tzanou, The GDPR and (Big) Health Data: Assessing the EU Legislator’s Choices.  
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domain of big data analytics- but can be generalised to cover big data issues more broadly. The 
overall discussion, therefore, adopts a broader scope in this respect.  
Finally, this contribution follows the definitions of ‘big data’, ‘AI’, ‘big data analytics’ 
and ‘health data’ as provided in the first chapter of this book.13  
 
<INSERT TABLE 7.1 HERE> 
 
2.2 Individual level issues associated to the processing of the data 
Big data present a number of challenges at the individual level relating to the processing of the 
data. These are identified and discussed below. 
 
1. Personal data and personally identifiable information 
It is normally assumed that the added value of big data is found in its capability to identify 
novel patterns14 rather than focus on personal identified information. Indeed, many significant 
medical trends and conclusions drawn in recent years are based on statistical analysis of huge 
databases that do not include personal information.15 Yet, two points should be raised here. 
Firstly, big data might contain personal information and secondly, it has been shown16 that 
modern data analytics can allow for the re-identification of individuals even if seemingly only 
anonymised data is processed.  
Personal data is defined in the GDPR as ‘any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person’; an identifiable natural person ‘is one who can be identified, 
 
13 Ibid.  
14 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Yann Padova, ‘Regime Change? Enabling Big Data Through Europe’s New 
Data Protection Regulation’, (2016) Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev, 315, 319. 
15 See Tal Zarsky, ‘Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data’ (2017) 47 Seton Hall Law Review 995, 
1000. 
16 See Ira Rubinstein and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘Anonymization and Risk’ (2016) 91 Washington Law Review 
703, 710-11.  
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directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification 
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.’17 
As processing of personal data triggers the application of data protection law, it is very 
important to establish when big data is composed of or entails personal information, i.e 
information that can be linked to a certain individual. In this case, data protection law would 
apply and govern the processing of the data. 
A distinct problem arises when no personal information is contained in the big data, yet 
there are ways to identify the persons concerned. In such cases, EU data protection legislation 
is clear. As soon as the data refers to a person who can be identified ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’, 
this is considered personal data and therefore data protection law applies. In Breyer,18 the CJEU 
adopted a broad interpretation of ‘identifiable person’ holding that in order to ascertain this, 
‘account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller 
or by any other person to identify the said person’,19 without requiring that ‘all the information 
enabling the identification of the data subject must be in the hands of one person.’20 In legal 
terms, this means that the possibility of re-identification of a person within the context of big 
data would make data protection safeguards and in particular the GDPR applicable.  
 
2. Legal basis for the processing and the problems and limitations of consent 
The literature has identified different ways in which big data can be generated. The LIBE 
Report on Big Data and Smart Devices21 distinguishes three categories of generating data 
 
17 Article 4 (1) GDPR.  
18 Case C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:779. For case-note 
see Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Breyer Case of the Court of Justice of the European Union: IP Addresses 
and the Personal Data Definition’ (2017) 3 (1) European Data Protection Law Review, 130. 
19 Ibid, para 42.  
20 Ibid, para 43. 
21 Gloria González Fuster and Amandine Scherrer, ‘Big Data and smart devices and their impact on privacy’, 
(2015) Study for the LIBE Committee. 
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sources: a) volunteered data, that is information volunteered or surrendered by individuals 
when they ‘explicitly share information about themselves or about third parties’ (e.g., when 
someone shares health-related information about herself or other people, such as their children 
on online social networks or enters information on a health app that predicts ovulation cycles); 
b) observed data, that arises by observing the activities of users (e.g., Internet browsing habits, 
GPS and location data when using mobile phones); and, c) inferred data that arise from the 
result of the automated analysis of other data (e.g., health insurance premiums calculated on 
the basis of a number of factors and data volunteered or observed).22 Based on this 
classification, it can be argued that the processing of different types of personal data might be 
based on different legal bases.  
 Consent is a common legal basis allowing for the processing of volunteered, observed 
(and inferred) personal data in social media, online apps and wearable devices. The GDPR 
strengthens consent and requires the informed consent of the data subject23  in order for 
processing to take place, but there are several problems regarding consent in the context of big 
data. Drawing on the existing academic literature,24 these problems can be summarised in two 
groups: data subject-related problems and systemic problems.  Data subject- related problems 
refer to concerns about whether individuals sharing their personal information on social media 
read privacy policies,25 whether even if they read them they actually understand these in an 
meaningful way as well as the consequences of sharing personal data and whether even if they 
 
22 Ibid,  21. Schneier has developed a taxonomy of personal data, on the basis of social media that includes six 
categories: service data, which is provided to open an account (e.g., name, address, credit card information, 
etc.); disclosed data, which is entered voluntarily by the user; entrusted data, for example the comments made 
on other people’s entries; incidental data, which refers to a specific user, but is uploaded by someone else; 
behavioural data, which contains information about the actions users are undertaking when using the site and 
may be used for targeted advertising; and inferred data, which is information deduced from someone’s disclosed 
data, profile or activities.  
23 GDPR, Art. 7.  
24 See Solove, ‘Introduction: Privacy self-management and the consent dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law 
Review 1880.  
25 Aleecia Mcdonald and Lorrie Cranor, ‘The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies’ (2008) 4(3) I/S: A Journal of 
Law and Policy for the Information Society, 543. 
 9 
read privacy policies and are indeed interested in protecting their privacy online nevertheless 
they normally tend to grant their consent almost immediately to proceed receiving the (often 
free) service/ benefit.26 While arguably these concerns apply to consent for the processing of 
personal data in general, the specific attributes of big data27 present further systemic problems 
regarding consent.28 In the context of big data, personal information may be processed multiple 
times in different ‘lifecycles’ involving different controllers and processors in each 
‘lifecycle’.29 The argument, therefore, goes that even if individuals gave their consent for the 
initial processing of their data, it is impossible to predict –let alone meaningfully consent- to 
the subsequent virtually limitless possibilities that these can be processed and aggregated. 
Furthermore, the information imbalances between data subjects and data controllers such as 
Facebook and Google in the context of big data may undermine the overall validity of the data 
subject’s consent.30 
 Besides consent, the GDPR provides for other grounds for the processing of personal 
data31 and the interpretation of certain grounds, such as processing necessary for the 
performance of a contract (Article 6 (1) (b) GDPR) and processing necessary for the purposes 
of the legitimate interests of the controller or a third party, except where such interests are 
overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject (Article 6 
(1) (f) GDPR).  
 
26 See José van Dijck, ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and 
ideology’, (2014) 12(2) Surveillance & Society, 199; Nina Gerber, Paul Gerber and Melanie Volkamer, 
‘Explaining the Privacy Paradox: A Systematic Review of Literature Investigating Privacy Attitude and 
Behavior’, (2018) 77 Computers and Security 226.  
27 See Tal Zarsky, ‘The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and 
Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making’ (2016) 41 (1) Science, Technology, & Human Values 
118.   
28 Art. 7 (4) GDPR provides ‘when assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of 
whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent 
to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract.’ 
29 See Tzanou, Introduction, n 12.  
30 See Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2015), 189 
and references therein.  
31 GDPR, Article 6.  
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3. Implementation and enforceability of fair and transparent processing 
Article 5 GDPR contains a number of data protection principles pertaining to the processing of 
personal data: lawfulness, fairness and transparency of processing, purpose limitation, data 
minimisation, accuracy and storage limitation. The Regulation requires that the controller who 
processes personal data is made ‘responsible for’ and must be ‘able to demonstrate compliance’ 
with these principles.32 It has been argued that these principles are categorically ‘incompatible’ 
with big data practices.33 Similarly to the case of consent discussed above, the alleged 
challenges or incompatibilities can be grouped in two categories: systemic and actor-related 
related.  
 Starting from the principle enshrined in 5 (1) (a), ‘lawful’ processing means that it 
should be carried out in accordance with the law.34 Fairness in processing denotes that data 
controllers must ensure that the collection and further processing of personal data is undertaken 
in a fair manner in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the data subjects.35 This also 
relates to the requirement of transparency of processing that has been explicitly included in the 
GDPR. The systemic challenges raised in this respect refer to the usage patterns and methods 
employed to process big data which are considered to be de facto at odds with the lawfulness, 
fairness and transparency principle as neither the controller collecting the data nor the data 
subject could have considered or even imagined such methods and patterns at the time of the 
collection.36 The actor-related challenges this time refer more to controllers  that cannot closely 
monitor and guarantee transparency in the processing of big data because allegedly they do not 
know where the information came from especially in processes of merging different databases 
 
32 GDPR, Art. 5 (2).  
33 Zarsky (n 15), 1020.   
34 See Maria Tzanou, The Fundamental Right to Data Protection: Normative Value in the Context of Counter-
Terrorism Surveillance (Hart Publishing, 2017) 26. 
35 Tzanou, ibid. 
36 Zarsky (n 15), 1006. 
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and re-using data37 that would render any transparency requirements costly, difficult or even 
impossible to deliver.38  
 The principles of data minimisation and storage limitation which require that data are 
‘adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they 
are processed’39 and that they are in principle ‘kept in a form which permits identification of 
data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are 
processed’40 respectively face similar challenges. At a systemic level, the ‘business model of 
big data’41 is perceived to be ‘antithetical’42 to the data minimisation and storage limitation 
principles.43 This antithesis is inherent to the nature of big data which provides controllers with 
a ‘clear incentive to collect and retain as much data as they can for as long as possible’.44 The 
argument, therefore, goes that ‘diligently enforcing’ data minimisation principles would limit 
the success of big data initiatives and undermine their utility.45 At the individual/controller 
level, the challenges of big data to the principles of data minimisation and storage limitation 
are drawn from the same utilitarian argument: why should controllers collect and store less 
data since even more quantities can be easily made available to them? Or to put it differently, 
even if potential future benefits for collecting more data are uncertain and hypothetical, if the 
possibility to collect and store as much data as possible46 exists why should controllers not take 
advantage of it? In addition, even if data do not have any known utility currently, why erase 
 
37 Bart van der Sloot and Sascha van Schendel, ‘Ten Questions for Future Regulation of Big Data: A 
Comparative and Empirical Legal Study’ JIPITEC 1, 10. 
38 Ibid, 1006. 
39 GDPR, Art. 5 (1) (c). 
40 GDPR, Art. 5 (1) (e). 
41 See Colin Bennett & Robin Bayley, Privacy Protection in the Era of 'Big Data': Regulatory Challenges and 
Social Assessments in Bart van der Sloot et al. (eds.) Exploring the boundaries of big data (Amsterdam 
University Press, Amsterdam 2016) 
205, 210. 
42 Ibid. 
43 As put by the Dutch DPA in an empirical study ‘Big Data is all about collecting as much information as 
possible.’ See van der Sloot and van Schendel (n 37), 9. 
44 Zarsky (n 15), 1011. 
45 Ibid. 
46 See van der Sloot and van Schendel (n 37), 9.  
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them permanently if in the future there might be a potential use, for instance, through 
aggregation with data that are not even currently available?47 
     Finally, concerns arise regarding the accuracy principle. This requires that personal data 
must be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.48 It is in the interest of controllers to 
ensure the accuracy of the data they process, but in the context of big data it might prove 
difficult to take steps to ensure that inaccurate data are erased or rectified without delays,49 
especially when these have been further merged with other data.50 Indeed, Article 5 (1) (d) 
GDPR requires that ‘reasonable’ steps should be taken in this respect which raises questions 
whether erasing or rectifying the information is a reasonable step that can be taken in the 
context of big data in order to comply with the principle of accuracy. Indeed, the trend behind 
big data appears to be ‘quantity over quality’.51 
  
4. Big data re-purposing 
It has been argued that big datasets are likely to contain ‘some intrinsic, hidden, not yet 
unearthed’ treasures and, hence, ‘the treasure hunt’ race is ‘on to discover and capture’ all of 
them.52  The very idea, therefore, that big data often have ‘no fixed purpose’53 but their value 
and potential use will become clear after their hidden treasures are discovered, is arguably at 
odds with the purpose specification and purpose limitation principle. According to this, 
personal data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes.54 The common argument in 
this respect goes that purpose limitation is incompatible and rendered meaningless by the very 
 
47 As eloquently put by van der Sloot and van Schendel ‘Data can always be given a second life.’ Ibid.  
48 GDPR, Art. 5 (1) (d).  
49 GDPR, Art. 5 (1) (d).  
50 See relevant comments by Slovenian DPA as reported by van der Sloot and van Schendel (n 37), 9-10.  
51 Ibid, 10.  
52 Victor Mayer- Schoenberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, 
Work and Think, (John Murray, 2013), 15. 
53 Van der Sloot and van Schendel (n 37), 9 
54 Article 5 (1) (b) GDPR.  
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nature of big data that cannot specify certain purposes for collecting the data; rather ‘data 
collection and analysis are themselves the purposes’ for the data collection.55 This argument 
links to the systemic challenges identified above regarding fair and lawful processing in general 
and more particularly, the data minimisation problems.  
 
5. Data Security  
In the era of big data and cloud computing, a higher risk of security breaches including both 
unauthorised access to the data and accidental loss will unavoidably emerge.56 Numerous, 
troubling security breaches of health have been recorded over the years.  
Safeguarding the security of big data can be a challenging task taking into account the 
multiplicity of stakeholders (controllers, processors, data brokers, third parties); the diversity 
of means through which the data is acquired (IoT, mobile phones, wearables, social networks, 
etc.) and the sheer quantity of data collected, aggregated and stored.57  
The GDPR includes a general principle that requires data controllers to ensure the 
appropriate security of personal data (the integrity and confidentiality principle)58 and 
introduces new rules regarding the security of processing59 and data breach notifications.60 
 
6. Difficulties in identifying Special categories of data 
 
55 Lokke Moerel and Corien Prins, Privacy for the homo digitalis, Proposal for a new regulatory framework for 
data protection in the light of big data and the internet of things < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2784123>,  2.  
56 See Ernesto Damiani et al. Big data threat landscape and good practice guide. ENISA, January 2016. 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/bigdata-threat-landscape and Rossen Naydenov et al. Big data 
security. Good practices and recommendations on the security of big data systems. ENISA, December 2015. 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/big-data-security.  
57 See Antoinette Rouvroy, ‘“Of Data and Men” Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in a World of Big Data’, 
Bureau of the Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data [ETS 108], 29.  
58 Article 5 (1) (f) GDPR. 
59 Article 32 GDPR. 
60 Articles 33 and 34 GDPR. 
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The GDPR provides increased protection to special categories of data, such as those revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union 
membership, genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural 
person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual 
orientation.61 In fact, the processing of such data is in principle prohibited as a general rule,62 
and only permitted in specific instances.63  
 It is difficult, however, to demarcate what constitutes special and non-special categories 
of data and these difficulties are exacerbated in the big data context. Take the example of health 
data that are considered a special category of data under the GDPR. Health data are found in a 
variety of sources, such as GPs’ and electronic health records (EHRs), prescriptions, laboratory 
tests, patient hospital monitoring, etc. They are generated by the Internet of Things (IoT) 
through wearables that monitor everything from physical activity to sleep, stress and pulse rate, 
smart patches, electronic skins and ingestibles.64 These are further augmented by the huge 
amount of health and fitness apps where individuals volunteer information among others, about 
their body, sexual activities, mood, smoking habits, women’s intimate health (such as 
menstrual cycles), etc. Health data are also shared in social media, such as Facebook, Twitter 
and Instagram and specific health networking platforms and online support communities, such 
as PatientsLikeMe and are generated by online searches. 65  
These raises fundamental questions as to what type of information will be considered 
as falling within the sensitive, special category of health data. Even innocuous information, 
such as supermarket shopping lists, can reveal details about what we eat and -what we do not- 
 
61 Article 9 GDPR. 
62 Article 9 (1) GDPR. 
63 Article 9 (2) GDPR. 
64 See Nathan Cortez, The Internet of Things (IoT) and Health Big Data- Introduction in Glenn Cohen et al. 
(eds.) Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 125. 
65 For details on health data sources see Introductory chapter. See also, Urs Grasser, Shifting Paradigms- Big 
Data’s Impact on Health law and Bioethics- Introduction in G. Cohen et al. (eds.) Big Data, Health Law, and 
Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 15.  
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and, therefore, our health condition. Are these also health data protected under Article 9 
GDPR? The answer depends ultimately on the particular circumstances, the context and even 
the purposes for which the data are -or might be- used.66 This, of course, creates uncertainties 
as to what types of data should fall under special categories and the relevant grounds of 
processing applicable in these cases. Such unclear boundaries provide significant discretion to 
controllers and concomitantly, might result in decreasing the protection of data subjects.      
 
7. Effective exercise of data subject’s rights 
The GDPR provides a number of rights to data subjects, such as right to information,67 access,68 
rectification,69 erasure (‘right to be forgotten’),70 a right to restriction of processing,71 and a 
right to object72 and not be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling.73  
The meaningful exercise of these rights in the context of big data is considered ‘both 
unrealistic and deeply paradoxical’74. How are individuals expected to monitor all this data 
deluge every day and have control of how their information is imputed in databases, aggregated 
and used in order to be able to effectively exercise their access, rectification and erasure rights? 
Even if they are aware of this information, big data and its multiple lifecycles are notoriously 
antithetical to the very rationale and ways of exercising these rights. Against which controller 
should individuals turn, on the basis of which jurisdiction and regulatory framework, when and 
 
66 Moerel and Prins, n 55, 2.  
67 Article 13 GDPR. 
68 Article 15 GDPR. 
69 Article 16 GDPR. 
70 Article 17 GDPR. See also Maria Tzanou, The Unexpected Consequences of the EU Right to Be Forgotten: 
Internet Search Engines As Fundamental Rights Adjudicators in M. Tzanou (ed.) Personal Data Protection and 
Legal Developments in the European Union (IGI Global, 2020) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3277348.  
71 Article 18 GDPR. 
72 See Article 21 GDPR. 
73 Article 22 GDPR. 
74 Rouvroy, n 57, p. 34. 
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how? Similar problems arise from the controllers’ perspective. In this case, the argument goes 
that it is not feasible to ask controllers to keep ahead of the big data deluge in order to always 
be in a position to allow for the effective exercise of data subjects’ rights. These actor- related 
challenges for both data subjects and controllers are fed by and explained by the systemic issues 
that arise from the ways big data work. Similar to the case of the various fair information 
principles, the effective exercise and enforcement of data subjects’ rights would allegedly 
interfere with the successes of big data initiatives.  
 
8. Enforceability and enforcement of (data protection) law 
Significant concerns regard the temporal and territorial application of data protection law- for 
instance, the GDPR- to big data as well as the relevant enforcement mechanisms advanced by 
this. Given that such data are generated via wearables, IoT, mobile and online apps, and 
virtually the whole world wide web and stored on different clouds that can be located 
anywhere, it becomes obvious why enforceability issues are exacerbated in this context even 
if the GDPR has extended its ratione materiae and loci jurisdictional bite significantly.  
In addition to enforceability problems, there are also significant enforcement questions 
arising in the big data era. The GDPR has been criticised for placing the individual as a data 
subject at the core of its implementation and enforcement apparatus. By granting individuals 
the right to ‘informational self-determination’ or the right to ‘have control over their personal 
information’, through various principles and rights, such as the fair information principles and 
data subjects’ rights, it also passes on individuals the primary responsibility of monitoring the 
enforcement of such rights.  
Enter again the big data systemic issues here. Because of the nature and functions of 
these, individual data subjects are in most cases virtually unable to maintain effective control 
of all the pieces of their personal information in this respect. Control over personal information 
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is, therefore, almost meaningless in the big data context. The problems do not stop here. The 
GDPR has introduced accountability obligations for controllers, but again their effective 
enforcement in the big data environment appears questionable. Similarly, Data Protection 
Authorities (DPAs) are already overwhelmed in their supervisory role and this is going to get 
worse when they are asked to deal with big data cases.  
 Overall, enforceability and enforcement problems of legal frameworks in general, and 
data protection laws, such as the GDPR in particular, that might render the written law ‘a paper 
dragon in the age of the “digital tsunami”’75 pose serious concerns and cannot be ignored in 
this context. This chapter classifies the practical difficulties concerning the enforceability and 
enforcement, as an individual level challenge of big data concerning the processing of the 
information. Arguably, matters of enforceability and enforcement of legal regulation touch 
upon the outcomes of the processing of big data and pose societal challenges as well. This 
demonstrates that there are no clear boundaries between the different risks as classified in the 
analytical framework presented in this contribution, but certain risks may fall in more than one 
categories.   
 
2.3 Individual level issues associated to the outcomes of the processing  
Big data present complexities and challenges that we have not seen before. Data mining and 
automated processing using algorithms can create inferences and conclusions that we -humans- 
are unable to grasp. This issue is excellently captured by the ‘black box’ metaphor put forward 
by Frank Pasquale.76 Even if we voluntarily grant access to our data to be processed, we are 
unable to follow how the outcome of this processing was reached. This opacity of the ‘black 
box’ makes it impossible to have a clear understanding of the consequences of the processing 
 
75 Mireille Hildebrandt and Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The Challenges of Ambient Law and Legal Protection in the 
Profiling Era’, (2010) Modern Law Review, 428, 440.  
76 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information, 
(Harvard University Press, 2016).  
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of our personal data. An infamous example that demonstrates the problem comes from car 
insurance. People that use pads to protect their furniture are deemed to be more careful drivers 
and are therefore granted lower premiums than people that do not use furniture pads. How is 
the one (careful driving) inferred from the other (use of furniture pads)? The workings of the 
system are ‘mysterious’77 and they are made even more complicated when the algorithm is a 
machine-learning one.78   
     The analytical framework of the risks developed in this chapter considers that there are 
certain risks relating to the black box metaphor that arise at the individual level and can 
therefore affect the data subjects’ fundamental rights. These risks are different from the ones 
discussed above, however, as they refer to the outcomes of the processing of big data and not 
to the processing of the data as such. The risks represented on this axis concern the outputs of 
the data processes and in particular the inferences and conclusions that can be drawn following 
the automated processing of the data using algorithms and the decisions that can be taken as a 
result. These challenges in turn are identified and categorised below. 
 
1. Incorrect or unreliable conclusions 
Big data analysis is based on correlations. This means that the finding of a mere statistical 
relationship between two data values is enough to trigger a certain outcome or decision without 
it being necessary to establish whether there is an actual causal relation that explains this 
outcome.79 To take the example mentioned above, more careful driving is deduced from the 
fact that people use furniture pads. This is deemed enough to incur lower insurance premiums 
even if it is clear that a causal relationship between the two cannot be established; the 
 
77 Ibid, 3.  
78 See Tzanou, Introduction, n 12. 
79 Mayer- Schoenberger and Cukier, n 52, 52. 
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correlation in this regard is spurious (the association might be statistically robust but happens 
only by chance).80  
Furthermore, big data come from the aggregation of various datasets and can be often 
inaccurate or even contain errors. This ‘messiness’81 of the data may lead to unreliable 
conclusions.82 Algorithms can, therefore, make incorrect decisions that can have real effects 
on individuals. In the big data context this is made possible because there is an abundance of 
data -often inaccurate and erroneous- and correlations are used to gain valuable insights to 
them that are fast and cheap 83 without the need to investigate causality.   
 
2. Lack of transparency and foreseeability for the individual affected  
As seen above, algorithms are ‘black boxes’, making it impossible for individuals to anticipate 
their conclusions and to meaningfully comprehend the logic and processes employed to reach 
these. Algorithms are often protected under intellectual property rights or kept secret for 
commercial or national security purposes and are thus inaccessible to individuals.84 In addition, 
algorithms are highly complex, often containing many different rules and it is difficult or 
impossible to establish which points of entry determined how the resulting outcome was built. 
This refers to the algorithms’ opacity problem; individuals are unable to meaningfully 
understand how their conclusions came to be. As Pasquale explains, ‘we can observe [their] 
inputs and outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other’.85 Machine learning is 
another reason for this opacity; the algorithm can train itself to learn to predict unknown 
 
80 González Fuster and Scherrer, n 21.  
81 Mayer- Schoenberger and Cukier, n 52, 32. 
82 ‘Garbage in, garbage out’ refers to this problem. See Brent Daniel Mittelstadt et al., ‘The ethics of algorithms: 
Mapping the debate’, (2016) Big Data & Society, 1, 15.  
83 Mayer- Schoenberger and Cukier, n 52, 66. 
84 Mittelstadt et al., n 82, 6.  
85 Pasquale, n 76, 3.  
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variables and modify its behavioural structure during operation,86 thus producing outputs 
untraceable even to programme designers themselves.87    
 
3. Unfair and discriminatory conclusions and decisions  
The processing of big data can lead to biased and discriminatory conclusions. Indeed, it has 
been argued that big data create ‘unimaginable opportunities’88  for discrimination. 
‘Employers, financial institutions, marketers, … and others can now easily obtain a wealth of 
bid data about individuals’ health status and use it to make adverse decisions relating to data 
subjects’.89  
Algorithms are created by humans and unavoidably reflect their authors’ values, 
interests and pre-conceptions.90 More often, discriminatory conclusions, rather than being the 
result of intentional design of the system, reflect ‘widespread biases that persist in society at 
large’,91 replicating ‘pre-existing patterns of exclusion and inequality’.92 For instance, it was 
found that algorithms that ‘could predict skin cancers better than dermatologists turned out to 
be less accurate when diagnosing dark-skinned people because the system was predominantly 
trained with data from white people’.93 Pre-existing biases are particularly problematic as it is 
difficult to identify the root of such (unintentional) discriminatory outcomes and effectively 
challenge them in courts.94  Biases in the data might also arise for a number of different reasons, 
 
86 Mittelstadt et al., n 82, 6.  
87 Jenna Burrell, ‘How the Machine “Thinks:” Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms’ (2016) 
3 Big Data and Society, 1. 
88 Sharona Hoffman, Big Data’s New Discrimination Threats: Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act to 
Cover Discrimination Based on Data-Driven Predictions of Future Disease in Big Data in Glenn Cohen et al. 
(eds.) Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 85, 85. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Mittelstadt et al., n 82, 6. 
91 Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, ‘Big Data’s Disparate Impact’, (2016) 104 California Law Review, 671. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Allison Gardner, ‘Medical AI can now predict survival rates – but it’s not ready to unleash on patients’, The 
Conversation, 21 November 2019 < https://theconversation.com/medical-ai-can-now-predict-survival-rates-but-
its-not-ready-to-unleash-on-patients-127039 > and references therein; Angela Lashbrook, ‘AI-Driven 




including technological errors and failures, inaccuracies in the data that originate from a variety 
of resources, and other contextual factors present in the context of big data (such as re-
purposing of the data, different controllers and stakeholders involved in the data lifecycles, 
etc).   
   
4. Profiling and the effects of group analysis on individuals  
 Big data can be used to both uncover (hidden) patterns and correlations and apply these to 
specific individuals through decisions that affect them directly.95 Profiling96 refers to two 
different phenomena: the creation of a profile and its use in decision-making processes.97 The 
creation of profiles requires the identification of general trends, patterns and correlations in the 
data ‘not visible with the naked human eye’98 through the use of data mining. Such profiles can 
then be used to categorise and target specific individuals by attributing to them certain 
characteristics and risks on the basis of which decisions that affect them will be made.99    
 Profiling is problematic for several reasons. Big data profiling is predictive and 
probabilistic. It is based on the analysis of huge amounts of data from past behaviour or known 
cases to generate predictions about future behaviour and unknown features.100 Profiles drawn 
up using data mining are normally non-distributive meaning that the patterns identified in the 
data -which make up the specific group profile- do not apply to all members ascribed in the 
 
95 Zarsky, n 15, 1000. 
96 Art 4 (4) GDPR defines profiling as ‘any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use 
of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or 
predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal 
preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements’.  
97 Paul De Hert and Hans Lammerant, Predictive profiling and its legal limits: effectiveness gone forever? in 
Bart van der Sloot, Dennis Broeders & Erik Schrijvers (eds.) Exploring the Boundaries of Big Data (Amsterdam 
University Press, 2016), 145, 147. The Art 29 WP identifies four stages of the profiling process: 1) collecting 
data; 2) analysing data; 3) building a profile for an individual; 4) applying a profile to make a decision affecting 
the individual. See Art 29WP, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling 
for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, Adopted on 3 October 2017, 12.    
98 Hildebrandt and Koops, n 75, 440.  
99 De Hert and Lammerant, n 97, 147.  
100 Ibid. 
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group101 (as opposed to distributive profiles where the characteristics of the profile apply to all 
members of the group).102 Non-distributive profiles can stereotype and stigmatise people by 
categorising and treating them according to how their group profile is assumed to behave.103 
Such profiles can also result in unfair conclusions and unjustified discrimination for certain 
individuals,104 based on incorrect or unreliable assumptions105 regarding the categories the 
latter are inferred to belong to. Outcomes based on social sorting106 can subject people to 
financial, social and cultural segregation and exclusion.107 Finally, profiling touches upon the 
autonomy of individuals by ‘“normalising” them in the kind of behaviour the profile predicts’ 
on the basis of their group characteristics.108  
 
 
2.4 Societal level challenges 
Big data analytics can affect individuals in several ways, but they have broader consequences 
on the whole society as well. I call these the societal (or collective) level risks of big data. A 
clarification is needed here. As will be seen below, the issues that big data raise at the societal 
level can have serious implications on individuals’ fundamental rights as well. However, this 
chapter argues that this separate classification is necessary for two main reasons: First, it is not 
always clear what the particular harm of big data might be on specific individuals. I will borrow 
an example from surveillance here. In 2013, Edward Snowden, a CIA contractor, revealed that 




103 Article 29WP, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making n 97, 5.  
104 See above discrimination.  
105 See above incorrect and unreliable conclusions.  
106 See David Lyon, ‘Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique’ (2014) Big Data 
& Society 1, 10.   
107 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), EDPS Opinion 4/2015 Towards a new digital ethics: Data, 
dignity and technology, 11 September 2015, 13. 
108 Hildebrandt and Koops, n 75, 434. 
 23 
programme that granted it access to Internet data, such as email, chat, videos, photos and file 
transfers held by leading Internet companies, including Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, 
Skype, Apple and Youtube.109 The revelations caused a public outcry in Europe, but the US 
side maintained that US intelligence agencies did ‘not have the legal authority, the resources, 
the technical capability or the desire to intercept all of the world’s communications. Those 
agencies are not reading the emails of everyone in the United States, or of everyone in the 
world’.110 It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve in the fallacies of this argument,111 but 
if we are to take it on its face value, it is indeed extremely difficult for individuals -if not 
impossible- to know whether and when they are targeted by surveillance measures, by whom 
surveillance is undertaken and through which means. Yet, even if harm cannot be particularised 
on specific individuals, surveillance poses significant risks at the societal level. There is a 
second reason explaining the necessity of drawing a separate category of societal level 
challenges of big data. This is required in order to be able to develop appropriate legal and 
regulatory solutions. These will be touched upon later in the chapter; for the moment, the 
analysis focuses on a discussion of the societal level challenges. 
 
1. Surveillance  
Big data analytics have brought forward new concerns of mass surveillance. To be sure, 
surveillance is not a new phenomenon emerging in the age of big data.112 Nevertheless, big 
data have increased exponentially113 the possibilities for surveillance and have changed to an 
extent the actors involved in this. Surveillance in the era of big data analytics is ubiquitous, 
 
109 See Maria Tzanou, ‘European Union Regulation of Transatlantic Data Transfers and Online Surveillance’ 
(2017) Human Rights Law Review.  
110 Annex VI, Commission Implementing Decision of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU–US Privacy 
Shield, Brussels, 12 July 2016, COM (2016) 4176 final, 93. 
111 See Tzanou, n 109.  
112 Lyon, n 106.  
113 Ibid.  
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pervasive and goes well beyond the traditional model of state surveillance. Large organisations, 
like Google and Facebook hold almost every piece of information about our everyday lives. 
Surveillance permeates every aspect of our existence even our most intimate details. From 
wearables to smart sex toys and ‘spying vibrators’,114 data about our bodies and functions are 
visible to private companies.115 Indeed, commercial surveillance by Internet giants ‘dwarfs the 
surveillance conducted by national intelligence agencies.’116 
The problem of widespread surveillance in the context of big data affects individual 
persons but it is primarily a societal one. While people’s lives are rendered transparent, 
‘organisations engaged in surveillance are increasingly invisible to those whose data are 
garnered and used.’117 As a result of surveillance, profiles are built and predictions are made; 
behaviours are nudged; surveillance then feeds back the individuals to whom these profiles 
will apply and so on. 
 
2. Autonomy, equality and human dignity 
Big data analytics pose challenges to equality, autonomy and human dignity. The issues that 
arise from datamining, machine learning and profiling were categorised in the taxonomy 
presented in this chapter as individual level challenges that relate to the processing of the data. 
I argue here that these same issues raise problems that cannot be only captured by their effects 
on individuals, but we should consider the broader dynamics they create in the society. 
  Big data analysis leads to predictions that can be consequential, based on past 
behaviours but also preemptive,118 aimed to deliberately subvert future choices and equal 
 
114 Janet Burns, ‘We-Vibe Settles For $3.7M In “Spying Vibrator” Data Suit’,  Forbes, 15 March 2017 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2017/03/15/we-vibe-settles-for-3-7m-in-spying-vibrator-data-
lawsuit/#3ee371316021.  
115 Janet Burns, ‘The “Spying Vibrator” Suit Is Over, But Sex Toys Are Still Talking Data’, Forbes, 14 
December 2016 https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2016/12/14/the-spying-vibrator-suit-is-over-but-sex-
toys-are-still-talking-data/#692879384417. 
116 Yeung, n 1, 123.  
117 Lyon, n 106, 4.  
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opportunities.119 Personal autonomy is stifled if our ordinary, everyday lives are ‘determined 
by algorithms and their continuous variations’.120 Big data analytics are used to ‘seduce, coerce, 
discipline, regulate and control: to guide and reshape how people, animals and objects interact 
with and pass through various systems’.121 Profiling and its group effects can create ‘filter 
bubbles’ or ‘echo-chambers’122  undermining other fundamental rights such as freedom of 
expression and posing threats to democracy. Ultimately, the question that arises for our society 
is one of human dignity: how will we make sure that individuals are not treated as means to 
(the big data analytics) end?   
 
3. The power imbalances of big data  
Big data processing creates significant asymmetries in our society. Personal data have 
substantial monetary value123 and few parties get to reap this. For companies, such as Google 
and Facebook, personal data are their most valuable asset124 that is not accounted for on their 
balance sheet. 125 Indeed, such companies trade in personal data by granting ‘free’ services to 
users by harvesting their data and paid services to advertisers and other businesses to use these 
data. Data brokers mine the web to collect personal information and sell this to interested 
parties.126 Significant asymmetries arise as the ‘digital dividend’127 is not shared fairly between 
users-data subjects and the other stakeholders that trade personal data. As the EDPS observes, 
 
119 For example, see Samuel Gibbs, ‘Women less likely to be shown ads for high-paid jobs on Google, study 
shows’, The Guardian, 8 July 2015 < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/08/women-less-likely-
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120 EDPS, Opinion 4/2015, n 107, 13. 
121 Rob Kitchin, ‘Thinking critically about and researching algorithms’, (2017) 20 (1) Information, 
Communication & Society, 14, 19. 
122 EDPS, Opinion 4/2015, n 107, 13.  
123 See OECD, ‘Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring 
Monetary Value’, (2013) OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 220, OECD Publishing 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k486qtxldmq-en > 
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127 EDPS, Opinion 8/2016, n 125, 13.  
 26 
successful companies operating personal data services platforms are ‘able to discriminate by 
combining knowledge they extract from data with monopoly power and vertical integration in 
the markets’.128  
The asymmetries of big data are not merely about monetary winners and losers; more 
crucially, they are about imbalances of information and -ultimately- of power between those 
who provide the data and those who exploit them. At the micro level, such imbalances might 
be imperceptible to individuals, yet have real pernicious effects. For example, the recent 
revelation that a women’s fertility app with which women share the most intimate details about 
their bodies, including sex and menstruation information is funded by anti-abortion 
campaigners129 shows the disturbing extent of the complexities of the information and power 
asymmetries in the big data society. At the macro/ societal level the accumulation of such 
degrees of (market) power by private organisations might have serious social, economic, 
cultural and political consequences. As Kitchin observes, ‘far from being neutral in nature, 
algorithms construct and implement regimes of power and knowledge and their use has 
normative implications’.130 
 
4. The lack of accountability of data stakeholders131 
The information and power asymmetries in the big data society exacerbate the ‘black box’ 
phenomenon discussed above. The aggregation of different sets of data through their constantly 
evolving lifecycles, machine learning, and AI raise questions as to who bears responsibility for 
the outcomes of big data. Is it the humans that must be held accountable or the algorithms? 
 
128 Ibid.  
129 Jessica Glenza, ‘Revealed: women's fertility app is funded by anti-abortion campaigners’, The Guardian, 30 
May 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/30/revealed-womens-fertility-app-is-funded-by-anti-
abortion-campaigners  and Eva Wiseman, ‘Beware the fertility app that wants to share your data with anti-
abortion campaigners’, The Guardian, 9 June 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/jun/09/app-
creep-and-the-dark-side-of-sharing-private-date-on-our-phones.  
130 Kitchin, n 121, 19.  
131 Accountability is understood differently here from the ‘accountability principle under Article 5 (2) GDPR.  
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And to which degree? This lack of accountability is not only frustrating for the innocent 
individuals that are negatively affected. It seems to be imposing the ‘black box’ model on the 
whole society.132 An unaccountable society undermines the very principles of democracy and 
the rule of law.  
 
3. Addressing the Big Data Challenges  
 
3.1 The importance of the taxonomy and why the GDPR cannot provide a one-size-fits-
all solution 
The previous section has presented a conceptual map of the various issues raised by big data, 
classifying them at the individual and the societal level. Individual level concerns were 
furthermore distinguished depending on whether they relate to the processing of personal data 
or they occur as outcomes of the processing. The taxonomy attempts to capture the more 
important issues raised by big data pulling them together in broader themes, but these might 
entail further unknown risks. At the same time, several of the issues identified are not clear-
cut; they often overlap and recur -albeit in slightly different forms- at the individual and the 
societal levels. Moreover, similar challenges can be framed in different lights and examined 
through different lenses, often in such ways that it becomes difficult to properly define the 
problem and distinguish its effects (is it commercial surveillance or ‘surveillance capitalism’ 
understood as a ‘privately administered compliance regime of rewards and punishments aimed 
at modifying and commoditising behaviour for profit’?133) Nevertheless, this mapping is not of 
a merely theoretical, academic value. On the contrary, the taxonomy is crucial in order to be 
able to reflect on the ways the risks of big data can be properly addressed. 
 
132 Pasquale, n 76, 217.  
133 Shoshana Zuboff, ‘Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization’, (2015) 
30 Journal of Information Technology, 75, 83 and 85.  
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 Taking the conceptual map as a starting point, I would like to advance two main 
arguments: First, regulatory approaches to big data risks cannot be all-encompassing one-size-
fits-all measures. Solutions to big data problems should be searched at the particular level -
individual or societal- where the issue arises and may vary depending on the specific type of 
problem. On the one hand, individual level regulatory measures should be aimed at preventing 
harm to individuals and at safeguarding their basic rights and interests. On the other hand, 
approaches that aim to deal with the societal risks of big data should address the dynamics and 
the types of power that big data analytics bring forward.  
Against this backdrop, I come now to the main question of this chapter: What is the 
role of data protection laws in general and the GDPR in particular in regulating big data? The 
short answer is limited. The GDPR has been at the same time both hailed as the first piece of 
legislation that deals with big data and AI134 and accused of failing to cope135 or being entirely 
incompatible136 with big data developments. Despite being diametrically antithetical -the one 
praises the GDPR’s capabilities, the other condemns them as insufficient-, these two views 
share an interesting common point. They both seem to assume that data protection regulation, 
and in particular the GDPR, represent the main legal methodological solution attempting to 
grasp with big data. This assumption is not completely unfounded; indeed, the GDPR seems to 
make the same self-assertion.137 Yet, this individualistic methodology is not appropriate to deal 
with the power configurations and the dynamics that concern us here.138 Big data certainly 
entails personal data processing, but not all problems this raises are necessarily data privacy 
problems that should be dealt with by the GDPR just because they fall rationae materiae within 
 
134 See above.  
135 Gonçalves, n 6, 114.  
136 Zarsky, n 15.  
137 Art 29 WP notes ‘The GDPR introduces new provisions to address the risks arising from profiling and 
automated decision-making, notably, but not limited to, privacy.’ Article 29WP, Guidelines on Automated 
individual decision-making n 97, 6.  
138 Rouvroy, n 57, 22. See also Bart van der Sloot, The Individual in the Big Data Era: Moving towards an 
Agent-based Privacy Paradigm in Bart van der Sloot et al. (eds.) Exploring the boundaries of big data 
(Amsterdam University Press, 2016), 177.  
 29 
its scope of application.139 Such an assumption overlooks mechanisms and outcomes that are 
often completely irrelevant to data protection frameworks. Big data are less about identifying 
individuals -although they do have these capabilities- and more about ‘algorithmic forms of 
constantly evolving, impersonal categorisations of risks and opportunities’140 and generalistic, 
predictive and even pre-emptive profiles. The data itself has a ‘relational’ value: ‘it is the 
(cor)relations between data that makes them valuable and useful’,141  sensitive or less so.  
This explains why the typology of the big data challenges presented in this chapter is 
of crucial importance. By ignoring the two levels or conflating big data challenges at the 
individual and the societal level,142 we end up trying to understand why data protection 
legislative measures such as the GDPR are not fit for purpose for big data contexts. The 
challenge facing us, therefore, is not as has been -erroneously- suggested ‘how to take account, 
in personal data protection instruments, of the relational, and therefore also collective, nature 
of what, through data, merits protection?’143 In my view, the challenge is how to construct a 
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143 Rouvroy, n 57, 22. Emphasis added.  
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regulatory framework of what merits protection in the age of big data by going beyond short-
sighted visions that everything can be fitted in personal data protection instruments just 
because personal data is at stake.  
 
  
3.2 The limited but important role of the GDPR 
Where does all this leave the GDPR? I argue that its role is limited but important. The GDPR 
is an instrument that regulates personal data processing through its fair information and 
accountability principles and the rights it grants to data subjects. It cannot be denied, therefore, 
that by regulating personal data – the raw material of the big data society- it plays an 
instrumental role in dealing with the risks that big data analytics might incur. This 
instrumentality of the GDPR, however, in preventing big data risks is only of indirect and 
probable value. It is possible that some big data risks could be indirectly mitigated if the GDPR 
principles are properly applied. Considering the seriousness of big data challenges, it is clear 
that this is not good enough. To put it differently, we should not be expecting the GDPR to 
address all the big data issues. 
That being said, the GDPR has a role to play besides its indirect instrumental value. 
Going back to the taxonomy of big data challenges proposed above, I argue that the GDPR is 
able to deal with individual level challenges that relate to the processing of personal data. These 
are various and were discussed in detail in Section 2 but can be summarised as follows: some 
are data-subject- or data controller- related (I call these actor-related); some are systemic; and, 
all of them are modelled on and concern specific data protection rules.  
Data subject- related issues describe the difficulties of data subjects to take advantage 
of rights granted to them under the GDPR. For instance, it is alleged that data subjects do not 
properly exercise their right to inform themselves as they do not read privacy policies and even 
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when they do it is not certain they understand them. Data controller- related problems concern 
the difficulties controllers face to comply with their GDPR obligations. For example, it is 
difficult and costly for controllers to closely monitor and guarantee transparency in the 
processing of big data because allegedly they do not know where the information came from 
due to the aggregation and re-purposing of the data. Systemic challenges refer to the perceived 
inherent antithesis of big data with data protection principles. In this regard, the argument goes 
that big data are de facto incompatible with GDPR principles, such as data minimisation and 
storage limitation as their utility is linked to the amount of data collected (the more, the best) 
and the length of periods retained (the longest, the best).  
Despite the particular problems -actor-related or systemic- all the big data issues 
analysed above concern specific GDPR provisions (personal data and personally identified 
information, problems and limitations of consent, implementation of fair and transparent 
processing, big data re-purposing, data security, etc.) and are addressed by this instrument. In 
this respect, actor-related concerns either from the data subject’s or the controller’s side 
assume the non-enforceability of GDPR rights and rules just because it might be difficult to 
enforce them. These difficulties are not unique to big data, but arguably they augment within 
this context. Nevertheless, it is wrong to assume that the GDPR does not apply to big data just 
because it is difficult to enforce its principles. This argument is based on circular reasoning and 
it ends up denying legal protection for no good reason.  
The systemic challenges raised against the GDPR look more serious, but they are not 
insurmountable. The argument this time seems to be deontological (rather than ontological) in 
nature: the GDPR principles should not apply because they undermine the utility of big data. 
This implies a somewhat fake dilemma.144 The GDPR does not contain abstract rules aimed to 
 
144 The ICO notes ‘It’s not a case of big data or data protection, it’s big data and data protection; the benefits of 
both can be delivered alongside each other.’ Information Commissioner’s Office, Big data, artificial 
intelligence, machine learning and data protection, 20170904 Version: 2.2, para 28.  
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be antithetical to the big data business model. On the contrary, it has two equally important 
objectives: to ensure that personal data move freely while the rights and freedoms of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data are protected.145 The GDPR aims to act 
as an ‘enabler of big data services in Europe’146 by providing for context- specific rules147 that 
could open up ‘some concrete doors for big data to flourish’148 while safeguarding at the same 
time the rights of data subjects. The systemic challenges argument is also based on the 
assumption that big data should remain an unregulated space because any regulation limiting 
these risks might undermine their utility. As Zuboff has astutely put it, this somehow implies 
‘the attribution of agency to “technology.” “Big data” is cast as the inevitable consequence of 
a technological juggernaut with a life of its own entirely outside the social. We are but 
bystanders.’149 This cannot be accepted. Big data should be able to produce their potential while 
respecting relevant regulatory frameworks applicable to them.      
To sum up, the GDPR has a role to play when individual -level issues relating to the 
processing of personal data in the age of big data are at stake. This is because the GDPR sets 
out a comprehensive legal framework and contains a variety of mechanisms to address these. 
These are flexible and allow for context-specific solutions. They include legal rules (and their 
exemptions and exceptions thereof) stipulating the conditions under which processing is lawful 
and the obligations of data controllers. They also entail technological solutions; data protection 
by design and by default150 aim at developing systems, programmes and applications that 
incorporate data protection principles such as data anonymisation, pseudonymisation, 
 
145 Art. 1 GDPR.  
146 Commission, ‘The EU Data Protection Reform and Big Data, Factsheet’ March 2016. See also Gonçalves n 
6, 114 who argues that the GDPR demonstrates ‘the EU’s deliberate, actually explicit intent to simplify rules for 
companies in the digital age’ and ‘caught between its twofold objective of strengthening the rights of the data 
subjects, and facilitating business, the EU legislator ended up favouring the latter to the detriment of the 
former.’ 
147 See Art. 5 (1).  
148 Mayer-Schonberger and Padova, n 14, 318.  
149 Zuboff, n 133, 75.  
150 Art 25 GDPR and Recital 78.  
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transparency, enhanced security into the design of the system.151 Finally, alongside mandatory 
requirements, the GDPR allows for ‘soft law’ tools such as codes of conduct and certification 
mechanisms that can take account ‘of the specific characteristics of the processing carried out 
in certain sectors and the specific needs of micro, small and medium enterprises’.152 
Whether specific solutions enshrined in the GDPR are fit for purpose and effective in 
practice in the age of big data remains an open issue, allowing for the possible re-working of 
certain models and approaches in the future. For example, the concept of consent and its 
seemingly enhanced emphasis under the GDPR is an issue that should be revisited in the 
future.153 This, however, does not negate the fact that the GDPR is a legislative instrument 
well-placed to deal with the individual- level challenges relating to the processing of personal 
data identified above.   
 
 
4. Addressing issues that relate to the outcomes of the processing and societal level 
challenges of big data 
As mentioned above, the GDPR has only an indirect instrumental role to play when issues 
relating to the outcomes of the processing and societal challenges of big data are at stake: by 
 
151 As the EDPS correctly recommends ‘Designers and manufacturers should apply the same level of creativity 
and dynamicity they usually display in introducing attractive devices and apps to also provide individuals with 
effective and user-friendly privacy notices and setting options. As a result, individuals should be able to set 
options relevant to their privacy and data protection with the awareness that this is an important element of the 
devices and apps’ use, in their own personal interest, and not a boring formality or a useless burden.’ EDPS, 
Opinion 1/2015 Mobile Health- Reconciling technological innovation with data protection, 13. See also EDPS, 
Opinion 7/2015 (n 3), 14.   
152 Recital 98 GDPR. See also Art 40 GDPR.  
153 The Centre for Information Policy Leadership (CIPL) observes that ‘Despite the fact that there are six legal 
basis contained in the GDPR, none of which are privileged over the other, there is a general feeling among data 
protection practitioners, lawyers and DPOs that DPAs, lawmakers and policymakers in the EU place strong 
emphasis on consent as a more important legal basis… For the GDPR to serve as a modern privacy law, its 
consent requirements cannot be emphasised as the principal legal ground for processing, nor should the other 
legal bases be continuously construed narrowly.’ Centre for Information Policy Leadership, ‘GDPR One Year 
In: Practitioners Take Stock of the Benefits and Challenges’, 31 May 2019, < 
https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/cipl_report_on_gdpr_one_year_in_-
_practitioners_take_stock_of_the_benefits_and_challenges.pdf>, 8.  
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regulating personal data it could potentially minimise or prevent some of the risks analysed 
above. Yet, the GDPR itself aims at a much higher objective: it purports ‘to address the risks 
arising from profiling and automated decision-making, notably, but not limited to, privacy’.154 
For instance, Article 22 GDPR ‘establishes a general prohibition for decision-making based 
solely on automated processing’155 that produces legal effects concerning the data subject or 
significantly affects her.156 The GDPR also grants data subjects rights to access157 and be 
informed158 about the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling and to 
receive meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the 
envisaged consequences of such processing and the right to contest the decision.159  
Admittedly, automated decision-making involving personal data constitutes processing 
within the meaning of the GDPR160 but it is not the application of the general data protection 
principles and data subject rights to this that is contested.161 What is problematic is the specific 
rules on automated decision- making and profiling seen above. Leaving aside questions 
regarding the effectiveness of such provisions in the age of big data, there is another 
fundamental problem that arises here. This is about regulatory overreach and perhaps more 
crucially, what Brownsword termed ‘normative disconnection’162: the GDPR essentially 
attempts to control the outcomes of algorithmic processing and grant the persons affected by 
this due-process rights. But, even if AI risks arise at the individual level, they are hardly issues 
that concern the data subject. They concern decision-making processes, dynamics and 
outcomes that should not be confounded with data-processing issues. Therefore, the problem 
 
154 Art 29 WP Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of 
Regulation 2016/679, 6.   
155 Ibid, 19.  
156 See also Recital 71.  
157 Article 15 (1) (h) GDPR.  
158 Articles 13(2) (f) and 14(2) (g) GDPR.  
159 Article 22 (3) GDPR.  
160 Article 4 (2) GDPR.  
161 See Article 29WP, Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making n 97, 9-19.    
162 Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (OUP, 2008), 166.  
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is not that these GDPR provisions are not fit for purpose; the problem is that they are not 
appropriate at all to deal with outputs irrelevant to the GDPR’s scope.163  
The individual-level challenges that occur as outcomes of the processing and the 
societal challenges of big data require regulatory methodologies that go beyond the atomistic, 
data subject- centred GDPR approach. How would these look like? The answer to this could 
be the subject of a whole monograph, but four preliminary points could be advanced here.  
First, regulatory responses should correspond directly to the level and the types of risks 
we are facing. It is for this reason that the taxonomy of challenges presented in the first part of 
this chapter becomes relevant. For instance, the problems raised by profiling at the individual 
level should be addressed by ‘sui generis’164 (and often sector-specific) measures that mandate 
the audit of algorithms and grant interested groups -and wherever possible individuals- specific 
profiling due-process rights165 that are independent to whether the personal data of a certain 
data subject were processed at a certain time point by unknown controllers.  
Second, AI and big data challenges require a combination of different approaches rather 
than a single legislative measure. In this respect, the methodological approach of the EDPS of 
viewing big data as posing data protection, competition and consumer law problems and 
therefore requiring a holistic inter-sectorial methodology is certainly a step towards the right 
direction.  
 
163 As Koops observes ‘This… requires stretching the concept of personal data (sometimes to the point of 
breaking, or perhaps rather of becoming void of meaning), or stretching the regulatory problem so that it 
becomes a problem of processing personal data.’ Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The trouble with European data protection 
law’, (2014) 4 (4) International Data Privacy Law, 250, 258.  
164 Ibid, 260.  
165 See Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale, ‘The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions’, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 2014 – 8; Crawford and Schultz propose ‘procedural data due process’ for big data that ‘rather than attempt 
regulation of personal data collection, use, or disclosure ex ante, procedural data due process would regulate the 
fairness of Big Data’s analytical processes with regard to how they use personal data (or metadata derived from 
or associated with personal data) in any adjudicative process, including processes whereby Big Data is being 
used to determine attributes or categories for an individual.’ Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, ‘Big Data and 
Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms’, (2014) 55 B.C.L. Rev., 93, 109.  
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Third, solutions require innovative thinking that includes both a transformational 
evolution of current ways of regulating ever-existing problems such as discrimination as well 
as the adoption of completely new rules addressing specific AI and big data challenges. For 
example, in the US context Sharona Hoffmann proposes that in the era of big health data the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (the federal law that prohibits public and private bodies 
from discriminating against individuals because of their disabilities) be amended to expand its 
anti-discrimination scope to include also a prohibition of ‘future’ physical or mental 
impairments.166 Given that predictive medicine profiling has been a reality for several years 
now,167 legislators should proactively reflect on how to protect people from predictive, 
inferential discriminatory decisions as well.  
Fourth, separate, specific rules might be needed for different stakeholders in the big 
data society, such as data brokers,168 platforms,169 the insurance sector, etc. These should 






166 Hoffman, n 88, 85.  
167 EDPS, Opinion 1/2015 Mobile Health: Reconciling technological innovation with data protection, 21 May 
2015, 10.  
168 Data brokers should comply with data protection legislation, but specific legislative measures could also be 
applicable to them. See Privacy International, Why we’ve filed complaints against companies that most people 
have never heard of – and what needs to happen next, 8 November 2018, < 
https://privacyinternational.org/advocacy/2434/why-weve-filed-complaints-against-companies-most-people-
have-never-heard-and-what>; Amit Katwala, ‘Forget Facebook, mysterious data brokers are facing GDPR 
trouble’, Wired, 8 November 2018 < https://www.wired.co.uk/article/gdpr-acxiom-experian-privacy-
international-data-brokers>  .  
169 See Christian Sandvig, et al, ‘An Algorithm Audit.’ In: Seeta Peña Gangadharan, ed., Data and 
Discrimination: Collected Essays. (New America Foundation, Washington, DC, 2014). <http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~csandvig/research/An%20Algorithm%20Audit.pdf >. The authors propose audits for 
online platforms that ‘will ascertain whether algorithms result in harmful discrimination by class, race, gender, 
geography, or other important attributes.’   
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Big data and AI raise a number of different challenges that legislators are still trying to grasp. 
In this respect, the GDPR is often presented as an example of a legislative solution aimed at 
addressing big data risks such as automated decision-making and profiling. This chapter has 
made three distinct contributions to the debate regarding regulatory approaches to big data: 1) 
it has provided a taxonomy of big data challenges; 2) it has examined the capabilities and 
limitations of the GDPR to address the risks identified; and, 3) it has offered some suggestions 
on the pathways that the regulators should be considering.  
Big data challenges are mapped in three categories: individual issues that relate to the 
processing of personal data; individual level issues relating to the outcomes of the processing; 
and societal level challenges. It was argued that the GDPR is well-placed to deal with 
individual issues relating to the processing of personal data, but its atomistic, ‘privacy self-
management’,170 data-subject- focused approach is completely inappropriate to address risks 
that occur as the result of processing and societal level challenges. These require innovative 
ways of thinking that approach the players and complex dynamics of the big data and AI society 
in a holistic way, while presenting targeted solutions to the specific risks identified at each 








170 Solove, n 24, 1880.  
